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PRODUCT SUBSET PROBLEM : APPLICATIONS TO NUMBER
THEORY AND CRYPTOGRAPHY
K. A. DRAZIOTIS, V. MARTIDIS, AND S. TIGANOURIAS
Abstract. We consider applications of Subset Product Problem (SPP) in
number theory and cryptography. We obtain a probabilistic algorithm that
attack SPP and we analyze it with respect time/space complexity and suc-
cess probability. In fact we provide an application to the problem of finding
Carmichael numbers and an attack to Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem,
where we update previous results.
1. Introduction
In the present paper we study the modular version of subset product problem
(MSPP). We consider an application to number theory and cryptography. Further-
more, we shall provide an algorithm for solving MSPP based on birthday paradox
attack. Finally we analyze the algorithm with respect to success probability and
time/space complexity. Our applications concern the problem of finding Carmichael
numbers and as far as the application on cryptography, we update previous results
concerning an attack to the Naccache-Stern Knapsack (NSK) public key cryptosys-
tem. We begin with the following definition.
Definition 1.1 (Subset Product Problem). Given a list of integers L and an integer
c, find a subset of L whose product is c.
This problem is (strong) NP-complete using a transformation from Exact Cover
by 3-Sets (X3C) problem [12, p. 224], [39]. Also, see [11, Theorem 3.2], the authors
proved that is at least as hard as Clique problem (with respect fixed-parameter
tractability). In the present paper we consider the following variant.
Definition 1.2 (Modular Subset Product Problem : MSPPΛ). Given a positive
integer Λ, an integer c ∈ Z∗Λ and a vector (u0, u1, ..., un) ∈ (Z∗Λ)n+1, find a binary
vector m = (m0,m1, ...,mn) such that
(1.1) c ≡
n∏
i=0
umii mod Λ.
The MSPPΛ(P, c) problem can be defined also as follows : Given a finite set P ⊂ Z∗Λ
and a number c ∈ Z∗Λ, find a subset B of P, such that∏
x∈B
x ≡ c mod Λ.
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We can define MSPP for a general abelian finite group G as following. We write
G multiplicative.
Definition 1.3 (Modular Subset Product Problem for G, MSPPG(P, c)). Given
an element c ∈ G and a vector (u0, u1, ..., un) ∈ Gn+1, find a binary vector m =
(m0, ...,mn) such that,
(1.2) c =
n∏
i=0
umii .
Although in the present work we are interested in G = Z∗Q where Q is highly
composite number (the case of Carmichael numbers) or prime (the case of NSK
cryptosystem).
1.1. Our Contribution. First we provide an algorithm for solving product subset
problem based on birthday paradox. This approach is not new, for instance see [29,
Section 2.3]. Here we use a variant of [4, Section 3]. We study and implement
a parallel version of this algorithm. This result to an improvement of the tables
provided in [4]. Further, except the cryptanalysis of NSK cryptosystem, we ap-
plied our algorithm to the searching of Carmichael numbers. We used a method
of Erdo˝s, to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers with many prime divisors.
We managed to generate a Carmichael number with 19589 prime factors1. Finally,
we provide an abstract version of the algorithm in [4, Section 3], to the general
product subset problem and further we analyze the algorithm as far as the selec-
tion of the parameters (this is provided in Proposition 2.2).
Roadmap. This paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we introduce the
attack to MSPP based on birthday paradox. We further provide a detailed analy-
sis. Section 3 is dedicated to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers with many
prime factors. We provide the necessary bibliography and known results. In the
next section we obtain a second application of MSPP to Naccache-Stern Knapsack
cryptosystem. In section 5 we provide experimental results. Finally, the last section
contains some concluding remarks.
2. Birthday Attack to Modular Subset Product Problem
We call density of MSPPG(P, c) the positive real number
d =
|P|
log2 |G|
.
If G = Z∗Λ, then
d =
|P|
log2 |Z∗Λ|
=
|P|
log2 φ(Λ)
,
where φ is the Euler totient function. In a MSPPG(P, c) having a large density, we
expect to have many solutions.
A straightforward attack uses birthday paradox paradigm to MSPPΛ(P, c). Rewrit-
ing equivalence (1.1) as
α∏
i=0
umii ≡ c
n∏
i=α+1
u−mii mod Λ,
1http://tiny.cc/tm6miz
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for some α ≈ n/2, we construct two sets, say U1 and U2. The first contains elements
of the form
∏α
i=0 u
mi
i mod Λ, and the second c
∏n
i=α+1 u
−mi
i mod Λ, for all possi-
ble (binary) values of {mi}i. So, the problem reduces to finding a common element
of sets U1 and U2. Below, we provide the pseudocode of the previous algorithm.
Algorithm 1 : Birthday attack to MSPPΛ(P, c)
INPUT : P = {ui}i ⊂ Z∗Λ (|P| = n+ 1), c ∈ Z∗Λ (assume that gcd(ui,Λ) = 1)
OUTPUT: B ⊂ P such that ∏x∈B x ≡ c mod Λ or Fail : There is not any
solution
1: I1 ← {0, 1, ..., dn/2e}, I2 ← {dn/2e+ 1, ..., n}
2: U1 ←
{∏
i∈I1 u
εi
i mod Λ : εi ∈ {0, 1}
}
3: U2 ←
{
c
∏
i∈I2 u
−εi
i mod Λ : εi ∈ {0, 1}
}
4: If U1 ∩ U2 6= ∅
5: Let y be an element of U1 ∩ U2
6: return ui :
∏
ui ≡ c mod Λ.
7: else return Fail : There is not any solution
This algorithm is deterministic, since if there is a solution to MSPPΛ(P, c) the
algorithm will find it. To construct the solution in step 6, we use the equation,
(2.1)
∏
i∈I1
uεii = c
∏
i∈I2
u−εii (in ZΛ).
It turns out y =
∏n
i=0 u
εi
i mod Λ. This algorithm needs 2
n/2+1 elements of Z∗Λ
for storage. To compute the common element (in line 4) we first sort and then we
apply binary search. Overall we need O(2n/2 log2 n) arithmetic operations in the
multiplicative group Z∗Λ.
We can improve the previous algorithm as far as the space complexity. First, we
need to define the notion of hamming weight of c. Let c ∈ Z∗Λ. We set
sol(c;P,Λ) = {I ⊂ {0, 1, ..., n} : c ≡
∏
i∈I, ui∈P
ui mod Λ}.
From this set we can easily build the set of all solutions of the MSPPΛ(P, c). Indeed,
if J1, J2, ..., Jk are all the sets in sol(c;P,Λ), then the set of solution is{
{ui} : i ∈ J1
}⋃{
{ui} : i ∈ J2
}⋃
· · ·
⋃{
{ui} : i ∈ Jk
}
.
We can simplify if we use the following characteristic function
χ : sol(c;P,Λ)→ {0, 1}n+1,
such that χ(I) = (ε0, ε1, ..., εn), where εi = 1 if i ∈ I else εi = 0. Thus, the set of
solutions
Sol(c;P,Λ) = {(uε00 , uε11 , ..., uεnn ) : χ(I) = (ε0, ε1, ..., εn) for all I ∈ sol(c;P,Λ)}.
To each element I of sol(c;P,Λ) (assuming there exists one) we correspond the
natural number HI(c) = |I| (the cardinality of I). We call this number local
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Hamming weight of c at I. We call Hamming weight H(c) of c, the minimum of all
these numbers. I.e.
H(c) = min{HI(c) : I ∈ Sol(c;P,Λ)}.
Now, we consider two positive integers, say h1, h2, such that, h1 + h2 = HI(c),
and two disjoint subsets I1, I2 of {0, 1, . . . , n} with |I1| = |I2| = b, for some positive
integer b ≤ n/2. Finally, we consider the sets,
Uh1(I1;P,Λ) =
{ ∏
i∈I1
uεii (mod Λ) :
∑
i∈I1
εi = h1
}
,
Uh2(I2, c;P,Λ) =
{
c
∏
i∈I2
u−εii (mod Λ) :
∑
i∈I2
εi = h2
}
.
We usually write them as Uh1(I1) and Uh2(I2, c) when P,Λ are fixed. We have,
|Uh1(I1)| =
(|I1|
h1
)
, |Uh2(I2, c)| =
(|I2|
h2
)
.
Remark 2.1. The set U1 of Algorithm 1 is written,
U1 =
dn/2e+1⋃
h1=0
Uh1({0, 1, . . . , dn/2e};P,Λ).
Similar for U2.
For the following algorithm we assume that we know a local Hamming weight of
the target number c.
Algorithm 1(a) BA MSPPΛ(P, c; b, `,Q, Iter)2 : Memory efficient attack to
MSPPΛ(P, c)
INPUT:
i. A set P = {ui}i ⊂ Z∗Λ with |P| = n+ 1 (assume that gcd(ui,Λ) = 1),
ii. a number c ∈ Z∗Λ,
iii. a local Hamming weight of c, say `,
iv. a positive number b : ` ≤ b ≤ n/2.
v. a hash function H, where we assume that the output is given as a series
of hex characters.
vi. Q : is a positive integer. HQ(x) is the sequence consists from the
first 4Q bits (or Q−hex characters) of the hash function H applied to
some number x.
vii. Iter is a positive integer.
OUTPUT: a set B ⊂ P, such that ∏x∈B x ≡ c mod Λ or Fail
1: (h1, h2)← (b`/2c, d`/2e)
2: For i in 1, . . . , Iter
3: (I1, I2)
$←− {0, ..., n}×{0, ..., n} (with I1, I2 disjoint and with b elements.)
4: U∗h1(I1)←
{
HQ
(∏
i∈I1 u
εi
i (mod Λ)
)
:
∑
i∈I1 εi = h1, εi ∈ {0, 1}
}
5: For each (εi)i such that :
∑
i∈I1 εi = h2
2BA : Birthday Attack
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6: If HQ
(
c
∏
i∈I2 u
−εi
i (mod Λ)
) ∈ U∗h1(I1)
7: Let y be an element of U∗h1(I1) ∩ U∗h2(I2, c)
8: return {ui}i such that
∏
ui ≡ c mod Λ and terminate
9: return Fail
This algorithm is memory efficient version of algorithm 1, since we consider
subsets of U1, U2. Although, this algorithm may fail, even when MSPPΛ(P, c) has a
solution. For instance, if we pick I1, I2 such that the union I1∪I2 6∈ sol(c;P,Λ), then
the algorithm will fail. This may occur when b < n/2, that is I1 ∪ I2 ⊂ {0, 1, ..., n}.
If I1 ∪ I2 = {0, 1, ..., n}, then I1 ∪ I2 ∈ sol(c;P,Λ). In this case, the algorithm
remains probabilistic, since we consider a specific choice of (h1, h2) and not all the
possible (h1, h2), with h1 +h2 = `. If we consider all (h1, h2) such that h1 +h2 = `,
then the algorithm is deterministic. In this case the analysis below is similar.
We analyze the algorithm line by line.
Line 3: This can be implemented easily in the case where 2b <
√
n. Indeed, we
can use rejection sampling in the set {0, ..., n} and construct a list of length 2b.
Then, I1 is the set consisting from the first b elements and I2 the rest. If 2b ≥
√
n
then, we have to sample from the set {0, 1, ..., n}, so the memory increases since we
have to store the set {0, 1, ..., n}. When we apply the algorithm to the searching of
Carmichael numbers we indeed have 2b  √n. In the case of NSK cryptosystem
we usually have 2b >
√
n.
Line 4: The most intensive part (both for memory and time complexity) is the
construction of the set U∗h1 . Here we can parallelize our algorithm to decrease
time complexity. To reduce the space complexity we decrease the two parameters
b ≤ n/2 and Q. If we do not truncate our hash function, then we store all the hex
digits of the hash (usually 128-bits). In subsection 2.4 we provide a strategy to
choose Q.
Line 5-6: In Line 4 we stored U∗h1(I1), in this line we compute on the fly the ele-
ments of the second set U∗h2(I2, c) and check if any is in U
∗
h1
(I1). So we do not need
to store U∗h2 . A suitable data structure for the searching is the hashtable, which we
also used in our implementation. Hashtables have the advantage of the fast insert,
delete and search operations. Since these operations have O(1) time complexity on
the average.
Line 7-8: Having the element found by the previous step (Line 6), say y, we con-
struct the ui
′s such that their product is y. We return Fail if the intersection is
empty for all the iterations.
Remark 2.2. If we do not consider any hash function and Iter = 1, then we write
BA MSPPΛ(P, c; b, `).
We implemented3 the previous algorithm and in a few seconds we found a solution
of MSPPΛ(P, c) for P = {2, 3, ..., 107}, Λ = 10000019, c = 190238 with local
hamming weight 11, b = 12 and iter = 150. We got the following solution:
A = {9851537, 303860, 4680021, 9647209, 2006838, 9984877,
2512434, 2126904, 1942182, 8985302, 2193757}.
3For a C++/Sagemath implementation see, https://github.com/drazioti/Carmichael
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Straightforward calculations provide,∏
x∈A
x ≡ 190238 (mod Λ).
2.1. Space complexity. We assume that there is not any collision in the con-
struction of U∗h1(I1) and U
∗
h2
(I2, c), or in other words we choose Q to minimize the
probability to have a collision. I.e. we choose 24Q  max{|U1|, |U2|} and we as-
sume that H is behaving random enough. In practice (or at least in our examples)
we always have this constraint.
So we get,
|Uh1(I1)| = |U∗h1(I1)| =
(|I1|
h1
)
and |Uh2(I2, c)| = |U∗h2(I2, c)| =
(|I2|
h2
)
,
where (h1, h2) = (b`/2c, d`/2e). By choosing |I1| = |I2| = b, we get
|U∗h1(I1)| =
(
b
h1
)
and |U∗h2(I2, c)| =
(
b
h2
)
.
We set
Sb =
(
b
h1
)
= Bb(h1).
In our algorithm, we need to store the Sb hashes of the set U
∗
h1
(I1).We need 4Q−bits
for keeping Q−hex digits in the memory. So, overall we store 4QSb bits. Further-
more, we store the binary exponents (εi)i that are necessary for the computation of
the products,
∏
i∈I1 u
εi
i . This is needed, since we must reconstruct c as a product
of (ui)i. These are Sb, thus we need b × Sb− bits. Since we also need to store the
set P of length n+ 1, we conclude that,
(2.2) M < (4Q+ b)Sb + (n+ 1)B (bits),
where B = max{log2(x) : x ∈ P}. Remark that M does not depend on the modulus
Λ.
` 9 11 13 15 17 19 21
M (GB) 0.029 0.05 0.2 1.16 6.15 28.61 117.2
Table 1. For b = 50, Q = 12 and P = {2, 3, ..., 107}.
If we can describe in an efficient way the set P we do not need to store it. Say,
that P = {2, 3, ..., n}. Then, there is no need to store it in the memory, since the
sequence f(x) = x + 1 describes efficiently the set P. Also, in other situations B
can be stored using O(|P| log2(|P|)) bits. We call such sets nice and they can save
us enough memory. In fact, for nice sets the inequality (2.2) changes to,
(2.3) M < (4Q+ b)Sb +O(n log2 n) (bits).
In fact when we apply this algorithm to the problem of finding Carmichael numbers,
we shall see that the set P is nice.
Finally, if Uh1 is very large we can make chunks of it, to store it in the memory.
Note that this can not be done if we directly compute the intersection of Uh1 ∩Uh2
as in [4]. This simple trick considerable improves the algorithms in [4].
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2.2. Time complexity. Time complexity is dominated by the construction of the
sets Uh1 and Uh2 and the calculation of their intersection. We work with Uh1 instead
of U∗h1 since all the multiplications are between the elements of Uh1 , only in the
searching phase we move to U∗h1 . Let MΛ be the bit-complexity of the multiplication
of two integers mod Λ. So
MΛ = O((log2 Λ)
1+ε)
for some 0 < ε ≤ 1 (for instance Karatsuba suggests ε = log2 3− 1 [19]). In fact re-
cently was proved MΛ = O(log2 Λ log2 (log2 Λ)) [16]. To construct the sets Uh1 and
Uh2 (ignoring the cost for the inversion mod Λ) we need MΛh1Bb(h1) = MΛh1Sb
bit-operations for the set Uh1 and MΛh2Bb(h2 + 1) ≈ MΛh2Sb bit-operations for
Uh2 . So overall,
T1 = MΛ(h1Sb + h2Sb) = MΛSb(h1 + h2) bits.
Considering the time complexity for finding a collision in the two sets by using a
hashtable, we get
T = T1 +O(1)Sb bits on average
and
T = T1 +O(1)S2b in the worst case.
We used that h1 ≈ h2 (they differ at most by 1). In case we have T threads we get
about T/T (bit operations) instead of T.
2.3. Success Probability. In the following Lemma we compute the probability
to get a common element in Uh1(I1) and Uh2(I2, c) when (I1, I2)
$←− {0, ..., n} ×
{0, ..., n}, where I1, I2 are disjoint, with b elements. Let 0 ≤ y ≤ x. With Bx(y) we
denote the binomial coefficient
(
x
y
)
.
Lemma 2.1. Let h1, h2 be positive integers and ` = h1 +h2. The probability to get
Uh1(I1) ∩ Uh2(I2, c) 6= ∅ is,
P =
Bb(h1)Bb(h2)
Bn+1(`)
.
For the proof see [4, section 3].
We can easily provide another and simpler proof in the case 2b = n + 1 (this
occurs very often when attacking Naccache-Stern cryptosystem). Then,
P = hyper(x; 2b, b, `),
where hyper is the hypergeometric distribution,
hyper(x;N, b, `) = Pr(X = x) =
(
b
x
)(
N−b
`−x
)(
N
`
) .
Where,
• N = n+ 1 is the population size
• ` is the number of draws
• b is the number of successes in the population
• x is the number of observed successes
Adapting to our case, we set N = 2b(= n+ 1), `(= h1 + h2) and x = h1. Then,
hyper(x = h1;n+ 1, b, `) = Pr(X = h1) =
(
b
h1
)(
b
`−h1
)(
n+1
`
) = P.
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The expected value is b`n+1 and since b = (n + 1)/2 we get EX =
`
2 . Since the
random variable X counts the successes we expect on average to have `/2 after
considering enough instances (i.e. choices of I1, I2). The maximum value of ` is
n/2. So in this case the expected value is maximized. So we expect our algorithm
to find faster a solution from another one that uses smaller value for `.
Also, we need about
1
P
=
(
n+1
`
)(
b
h1
)(
b
h2
) iterations on average to find a solution.
One last remark is that the contribution of b is larger than the contribution of
hamming weight, in the probability P.
Figure 1. We fixed n = 23000 and b = 35. We consider pairs
(h, f(h)), where f(h) =
(
P(b+ 1, h)/P(b, h+ 1)
)
and h the ham-
ming weight. We finally normalized the values by taking loga-
rithms. So, for a given (b, h), if we want to increase the probability
is better strategy to increase b than h.
2.3.1. The best choice of h1 and h2. The choice of h1, h2 (in line 1 of algorithm
1(a)) is h1 = b`/2c, h2 = d`/2e. This can be explained easily, since these values
maximize the probability P of Lemma 2.1. We set
J` = {(x, y) ∈ Z2 : x+ y = `, 0 ≤ x ≤ y}.
Observe that (b`/2c, d`/2e) ∈ J`.
Proposition 2.2. Let b and n be fixed positive integers such that ` = x+ y ≤ b ≤
n/2. Then the finite sequence P : J` → Q, defined by
P(x, y) =
Bb(x)Bb(y)
Bn+1(`)
,
is maximized for (x, y) = (b`/2c, d`/2e).
We need the following simple lemma.
Lemma 2.3. (
b
x
)(
b
`− x
)(
2b
b
)
=
(
`
x
)(
2b− `
b− x
)(
2b
`
)
.
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Proof. It is straightforward by expressing the binomial coefficients in terms of fac-
torials and rearranging them. 
of Proposition 2.2. . From the previous lemma we have
(2.4)
(
b
x
)(
b
`−x
)(
2b
`
) = (`x)(2b−`b−x )(
2b
b
) .
Since b, ` are fixed, the maximum of the right hand side is at x = b`/2c. Indeed,
both sequences
(
b
x
)
and
(
2b−`
b−x
)
are positive and maximized at x = b`/2c. So also
the product
(
`
x
)(
2b−`
b−x
)
is maximized at x = b`/2c. The same occurs to the left hand
side. Since the denominator of the left hand side in (2.4) is fixed, the numerator
Bb(x)Bb(`−x) =
(
b
x
)(
b
`−x
)
is maximized at x = b`/2c. Since n is also a fixed positive
integer, the numerator of P is maximized at x = b`/2c and so P is maximized at
the same point. Finally, `− b`/2c = d`/2e = y. The Proposition follows. 
2.4. How to choose Q. If we are searching for r−same objects to one set (with
cardinality n), when we pick the elements of the set from some largest set (with
cardinality m), then we say that we have a r−multicollision. We have the following
Lemma.
Lemma 2.4. If we have a set with m elements and we pick randomly (and inde-
pendently) n elements from the set, then the expected number of r−mullticolisions
is approximately
(2.5)
nr
r!mr−1
.
Proof. [18, section 6.2.1] 
Say we use md5 hash function. If we use the parameter Q, we have to truncate
the output of md5, which has 16−hex strings, to Q−hex strings (Q < 16). I.e
we only consider the first κ = 4 · Q-bits of the output. Our strategy to choose Q
uses formula (2.5). In practice, is enough to avoid r = 3−multicollisions in the set
U∗h1(I1) ∪ U∗h2(I2, c) of cardinality Sb, where
Sb = |U∗h1(I1) ∪ U∗h2(I2, c)| =
(|I1|
h1
)
+
(|I1|
h2
)
.
We set the formula (2.5) equal to 1 and we solve with respect to m, which in our
case is m = 2κ. So,
S3b
6 = 2
2κ. Therefore we get, κ ≈ (3 log2 Sb)/2 (since in our
examples log2(Sb)  log2 6). For instance if we have local Hamming weight ≤ 13,
b = n/2, |I1| = |I2| = b, and n = 232, we get κ ≈ 52. So, Q ≈ 13. In fact we used
Q = 12 in our attack to Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem.
3. Carmichael Numbers
Fermat proved that if p is a prime number, then p divides ap−a for every integer
a. This is known as Fermat’s Little Theorem. The question if the converse is true
has negative answer. In fact in 1910 Carmichael noticed that 561 provides such a
counterexample. A Carmichael number4 is a positive composite integer n such that
an−1 ≡ 1 (mod n) for every integer a, with 1 < a < n and gcd(a, n) = 1. They
named after Robert Daniel Carmichael (1879-1967). Although, the Carmichael
4See also, http://oeis.org/A002997
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numbers between 561 and 8911 i.e. the first seven, initially they discovered by the
Czech mathematician V. S˘imerka in 1885 [37]. In 1910 Carmichael conjectured that
there is an infinite number of Carmichael numbers. This conjecture was proved in
1994 by Alford, Granville, and Pomerance [2]. Although, the problem if there are
infinitely many Carmichael numbers with exactly R ≥ 3 prime factors, is remained
open until today. We have the following criterion.
Proposition 3.1. (Korselt, 1899, [21]) A positive integer n is Carmichael if and
only if is composite, square-free and for every prime p with p|n, we get p− 1|n− 1.
For a simple elegant proof see [9]. We define the following function.
λ(2a) = φ(2a) if a = 0, 1, 2
and
λ(2a) =
1
2
φ(2a), if a > 2.
If pi is odd prime and ai positive integer
λ(paii ) = φ(p
ai
i ).
If n = pa11 p
a2
2 · · · pakk then
λ(n) = lcm
(
λ(pa11 ), λ(p
a2
2 ), . . . , λ(p
ak
k )
)
.
Korselt’s criterion can be written as
Proposition 3.2. (Carmichael, 1912, [7]) n is Carmichael if and only if is com-
posite and n ≡ 1 (mod λ(n)).
Using the previous, we can prove that a Carmichael number is odd and have at
least three prime factors. Furthermore, we can calculate some Carmichael numbers
(the first 16): 561, 1105, 1729, 2465, 2821, 6601, 8911, 10585, 15841, 29341, 41041,
46657, 52633, 62745, 63973, and 75361. In [3] they used an idea of Erdo˝s [10]
to find Carmichael numbers with many prime factors. In 1996, Loh and Niebuhr
[22] provided a Carmichael with 1, 101, 518 prime factors using Erdo˝s heuristic
algorithm (Algorithm 1). Also, an analysis and some refinements of [22] and an
extension to other pseudoprimes was provided by Guillaume and Morain in 1996 in
[14]. Further, in the same paper the authors provided a Carmichael number having
5104 prime factors. In 2014 [3, Table 1] the authors provided two large Carmichael
numbers with many prime factors. The first one with 1, 021, 449, 117 prime factors
and d = 25, 564, 327, 388 decimal digits and the second with 10, 333, 229, 505 prime
factors, with d = 29, 548, 676, 178 decimal digits.
Also, in 1975 J. Swift [36] generated all the Carmichael numbers below 109. In
1979, Yorinaga [40] provided a table for Carmichael numbers up to 1010 using the
method of Chernick (this method allow us to construct a Carmichael number having
already one, see [14, Theorem 2.2]). In 1980, Pomerance, Selfridge and Wagstaff
[34] generated Carmichael numbers up to 25 · 1010. In 1988 Keller [20] calculated
the Carmichael numbers up to 1013. In 1990, Jaeschke [17] provided tables for
Carmichael numbers up to 1012. Pinch provided a table for all Carmichael numbers
up to 1018 ([26]). Also the same author in 2006 [27] computed all Carmichael
numbers up to 1020 and in 2007 [28] a table up to 1021. Furthermore, he found
20138200 Carmichael numbers up to 1021 and all of them have at most 12 prime
factors.
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For an illustration of our algorithm we also generated some tables for Carmichael
numbers having many prime factors5. For instance we produced Carmichael num-
bers up to 250 prime factors. Each instance was generated in some seconds. Also
Carmichael numbers with 11725 and 19589 prime factors were generated in some
hours with our algorithm, in a small home PC (I3/16Gbyte) using a C++/gmp
implementation.
The following method is based on Erdo˝s idea [10]. It was used in [3, 22] to pro-
duce Carmichael numbers having large number of prime factors.
Algorithm 3 : Generation of Carmichael Numbers
INPUT: A positive integer r and a vector H = (h1, h2, ..., hr) ∈ Zr, with
h1 ≥ h2 ≥ · · · ≥ hr ≥ 1. Also we consider two positive integers ` and b
which correspond to the local hamming and the bound, respectively.
OUTPUT: A Carmichael number or Fail
1: Q← {q1, ..., qr} the r−first prime numbers
2: Λ← qh11 · · · qhrr
3: P ← {p : p prime p− 1|Λ, p 6 |Λ}
4: S ← BA MSPPΛ(P, 1; b, `)
5: If |S| ≥ 2 return ∏p∈S p
6: B ←∏p∈P p
7: T ← BA MSPPΛ(P, B; b, `)
8: If |T | ≥ 2 return B/∏p∈T p
9: else return Fail
In line 8, we return the number
∏
p∈P−T
p.
Correctness.
It is enough to prove that the numbers returned in steps 5 and 8 are Carmichael.
Set n =
∏
p∈S p. We shall prove it for step 5. The set S contains all the primes of
P such that their product is equivalent to 1 (mod Λ). Since |S| ≥ 2, n is composite
and also is squarefree. Say a prime p is such that p|n. Since n ≡ 1 (mod Λ) i.e.
Λ|n− 1 we get p− 1|n− 1. Indeed, this is immediate since p− 1|Λ. From Korselt’s
criterion we get that n is Carmichael. Similar for the step 8.
We have set ` = local hamming. In case of success, the output of the algorithm is a
Carmichael number with ` or |P| − ` prime factors. In fact, if we want to calculate
a Carmichael number with many prime factors, we can ignore the lines 4 and 5 and
consider a large set P. An estimation for |P| was given in [22, formula 4],
|P| ≈ g(Λ)
r∏
j=1
(
hj +
qj − 2
qj − 1
)
, where g(Λ) =
Λ
φ(Λ) ln
√
2Λ
.
In lines 1 and 2 we initialize the algorithm. Since in practice r is not large
enough, both these steps are very efficient.
In line 3 we calculate the set P. One way to construct this set is the following.
Say d|Λ. If d + 1 is prime with d + 1 6∈ Q then d ∈ P. To find the divisors of Λ
having their prime divisors is a simple combinatorial problem. We can implement
5see, https://github.com/drazioti/Carmichael
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this without using much memory. Even better, we can use [3, Section 8] where they
keep only the exponents of the divisors of Λ. Since the set P contains integers of
the form 2a13a2 · · · parr + 1 with 0 ≤ ai ≤ hi, instead of storing 2a13a2 · · · parr + 1 we
can store (a1, ..., ar). Overall 8r|P| bits or r|P| bytes. So the set P is nice, since
the set B in formula (2.2) needs O(|P| log2(|P|)) bits for storage.
In line 4 (and 7), we use algorithm 1(a) with b = bound and ` = local hamming
according to the user choice. We can apply BA MSPP with the parameters Q and
Iter, BA MSPPΛ(P, c; b, `,Q, Iter). In [22] they picked T randomly from P.
Remark 3.1. In [3] they used another algorithm inspired by the quantum algorithm
of Kuperberg and they exploit the distribution of the primes in the set P (which is
not uniform).
Remark 3.2. When |P| is large enough then using B = 1 as target number we
can easily find a Carmichael number with small number of prime factors (by using
small local Hamming weight). If we use B > 1 as in line 5 we get a Carmichael
number with many prime factors. As we remarked previous the number of prime
factors of the Carmichael number is either ` or |P| − `. One advantage of the
algorithm is that we can search for Carmichael numbers near |P| − r. This can be
done by considering ` = local hamming close to r. In this way we quickly generated
Carmichael numbers up to 250 prime factors in a small PC.
4. Naccache-Stern Knapsack Cryptosystem
In this section we consider a second application of MSPP to cryptography. We
shall provide an attack to a public key cryptosystem. Naccache-Stern Knapsack
(NSK) cryptosystem is a public key cryptosystem ([29]) based on the Discrete Log-
arithm Problem (DLP), which is a difficult number theory problem. Furthermore,
it is based on another combinatorial problem, the Modular Subset Product Prob-
lem. Our attack applies to the latter problem. NSK cryptosystem is defined by the
following three algorithms.
i. Key Generation:
Let p be a large safe prime number (that is p = 2q+ 1, where q is a prime number).
Let n denotes the largest positive integer such that:
(4.1) p >
n∏
i=0
pi,
where pi is the (i+1)−th prime. The message space of the system isM = {0, 1}n+1,
this is the set of the binary strings of (n+ 1)−bits. For instance, if p has 2048 bits,
then n = 232 and if p has 1024 bits, then n = 130.
We randomly pick a positive integer s < p− 1, such that gcd(s, p− 1) = 1. This
last property guarantees that there exists the (unique) s−th root mod p of an
element in Z∗p. Set
ui = s
√
pi mod p ∈ Z∗p.
The public key is the vector
(p, n;u0, ..., un) ∈ Z2 × (Z∗p)n+1
and the secret key is s.
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ii. Encryption:
Let m be a message and
∑n
i=0 2
imi its binary expansion. The encryption of the
n+ 1 bit message m is c =
∏n
i=0 u
mi
i mod p.
iii. Decryption:
To decrypt the ciphertext c, we compute
m =
n∑
i=0
2i
pi − 1 ×
(
gcd(pi, c
s mod p)− 1).
From the description of the NSK scheme, we see that the security is based on
the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP). It is sufficient to solve uxi = pi in Z
∗
p, for
some i. The best algorithm for computing DLP in prime fields has subexponential
bit complexity, [1, 13]. Thus, for large p (at least 2048 bits) the system can not be
attacked by using the state of the art algorithms for DLP.
We have also assumed that the prime number p belongs to the special class of
safe primes to prevent attacks such as, Pollard rho [33], Pollard p−1 algorithm [32],
Pohlig-Hellman algorithm [31] or any similar procedure that exploits properties of
p− 1.
4.1. The attack. Since, c ≡∑ni=0 2imi mod Λ, we get
(4.2)
∏
i∈I1
umii = c
∏
i∈I2
u−mii (in ZΛ).
So we can apply BA MSPPΛ with input P = (ui)i and c and for some bound b
and hamming weight of the message m say Hm i.e. the number of 1
′s in the binary
message m. So in this attack we assume that we know the hamming weight or an
upper bound of it. To be more precise, this attack is feasible only for small or
large hamming weights. Our parallel version allow us to consider larger hamming
weights than in [4].
In the following algorithm we call algorithm 1(a), where we execute steps 4 and
5 in parallel (in function BA MSPPΛ)
Algorithm 4 : Attack to NSK cryptosystem
INPUT: ◦ The cryptographic message c
◦ the Hamming weight Hm of the message m
◦ a bound b ≤ n/2
◦ the public key pk = (p, n;u0, ..., un) of NSK cryptosystem
OUTPUT: the message m or Fail
1: P ← {u0, ..., un}
2: S← BA MSPPp(P, c; b,Hm)
3: if S 6= ∅ construct m. Else return Fail
4.1.1. Reduction of the case of large Hamming weight messages. The case where
we have large Hamming weight of a message can be reduced to the case where we
have small Hamming weight. Indeed, if the message m has Hm = n+ 1− ε, where
ε is a small positive integer, then again we can reduce the problem to one with
small Hamming weight. Let c = Enc(m) and c′ = c−1u2n
∏n−1
i=0 ui. We provide the
following Lemma.
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Lemma 4.1. The decryption of c′ is m′ = 2n+1 + 2n −m− 1, where Hm′ = ε+ 1.
Proof. [4, Lemma 3.4] 
So we can consider Hm < b. Indeed, if Hm ≥ b, we apply the previous Lemma
and we get Hm′ < b. So finding m
′ is equivalent finding m.
4.1.2. The case of knowing some bits of the message. If we know the position of
some bits of the message m (for instance by applying a fault attack to the system
may leak some bits), then we can improve our attack. In this case, we choose I1
and I2 in algorithm 4, from the set {0, 1, .., n} −K, where the set K contains the
positions of the known bits. Also, in line 10, when we reconstruct the message m
(in case of a collision) we need to put the known bits to the right positions.
5. Experimental results for NS
In our implementation6 we used C/C++ with GMP library [15] and for paral-
lelization OpenMP [30]. We used 20 threads of an Intel(R) Xeon(R) CPU E5-2630
v4 @2.20GHz, in a Linux platform.
First, in table 2 we present the improvement of the results provided in [4] by
using the parallel version. Besides, in table 3 we extend the results of the previous
table. In fact, table 3 demonstrates that having a suitable number of threads and
considering a suitable bound b we get a practical attack for low Hamming weight
messages. In figure 2 we represent some of our data graphically.
len(p) 600 1024 2048
Hm 8 9 10 8 9 10 7 8
Attack [4] 42s 300s 7.5m 8.1m 1.1h 1.96h 1.17h 2.15h
Parallel Attack < 1s 6.54s 15.56s 11.44s 70s 284s 70s 11.46m
Table 2. We used b = n/2, Q = 12, where n = 84, 130 and 232, for
len(p) = 600, 1024 and 2048 bits, respectively. For each column,
we executed 10 times the attack of [4] and our parallel version
(algorithm 4), and we computed the average CPU time.
6. Conclusions
In the present work we considered a parallel algorithm to attack the modular
version of product subset problem. This is a NP-complete problem which have
many applications in computer science and mathematics. Here we provide two
applications, one in number theory and the other to cryptography.
First we applied our algorithm (providing a C++ implementation) to the the
problem of searching Carmichael numbers. We managed to find one with 19589
factors in a small PC in 3 hours.
For the Naccache-Stern knapsack cryptosystem we updated and extended pre-
vious experimental cryptanalytic results provided in [4]. The new bounds for Hm
concern messages having Hamming weight ≤ 11 or ≥ 223, for n = 232. This is
proved by providing experiments. But, our attack is feasible for Hamming weight
6The code can be found in https://goo.gl/t9Fa68
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len(p) 600 1024 2048
n 84 130 232
Hm 12 13 14 11 12 13 9 10 11
Parallel (time) 4m 7m 13m 26m 66m 142m 52m 107m 895m
Mem. (GB) 1.43 4.93 7.5 14.28 21.67 67.41 26.9 40.61 127.53
Average Rounds 4.2 2.4 2.6 8.2 2.6 5.6 7.4 2.4 10
Table 3. Extension of table 2. For the case Hm = 13, Q = 12,
and len(p) = 1024 we used b = 60 instead of b = n2 = 65. For
the case Hm = 11 and len(p) = 2048 we used b = n/2 − 23 = 93.
For all other cases we used b = n2 . The last row, Average Rounds,
is the (average) round that eventually our algorithm terminates.
Theoretically is approximately 1P (see Lemma 2.1).
Figure 2. The horizontal axis is the hamming weight Hm and the
vertical axis is the cpu time in seconds (for the parallel attack). Us-
ing FindFit of Mathematica [38], we computed the following ap-
proximation formulas that best fit to our data, T600(Hm) = 0.003 ·
e0.71Hm , T1024(Hm) = 0.029·e0.76Hm and T2048(Hm) = 0.74·e0.9Hm
(seconds).
≤ 15 or ≥ 219. The NSK cryptosystem system could resist to this attack, if we
consider Hamming weights in the interval [17, 217].
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